U.S.–Israel–Iran Conflict Enters the Economic and Maritime Endgame

By AI TV INFO | Global Intelligence & Security Unit

From airstrikes to economic siege, the struggle over Hormuz and Iran’s financial lifelines

The six-month conflict between the United States, Israel and Iran has entered a new and potentially more consequential phase.

The defining battlefield is no longer only Iranian airspace, missile sites or nuclear facilities. It is increasingly the global financial system, the Strait of Hormuz, regional trade networks, energy infrastructure and the diplomatic architecture of the Gulf.

The opening phase of the war was characterized by direct military confrontation. On February 28, the United States and Israel launched the campaign that Washington designated Operation Epic Fury, striking Iranian leadership, military infrastructure and nuclear-related targets. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed in the opening strikes, and Iran subsequently appointed his son, Mojtaba Khamenei, as his successor.

Six months later, however, the central strategic question is no longer simply whether Iran can continue fighting.

It is whether Washington can economically isolate Tehran enough to force a political settlement before the costs of the conflict become greater than the benefits of continued pressure.

Reuters now describes the war as a costly stalemate or endgame: Iran has suffered enormous military and economic damage, but its government remains intact, its missile capabilities survive, and its ability to disrupt energy shipping gives Tehran continuing leverage. At the same time, prolonged U.S. operations have consumed weapons stocks and placed additional strain on American military readiness.

1. THE WAR HAS CHANGED CHARACTER

The United States and Israel achieved major tactical objectives during the opening months of the conflict.

Iran’s conventional air power and portions of its missile and military infrastructure were severely degraded. Its senior leadership suffered devastating losses, including Khamenei. The U.S. Central Command continues to describe Operation Epic Fury as an effort to dismantle Iran’s security apparatus and neutralize threats to U.S. forces.

But tactical military success has not translated into a decisive political outcome.

Iran’s government survived.

Its military command structure adapted.

Its missile arsenal was not eliminated.

And, most importantly, Tehran retained an instrument capable of imposing costs far beyond Iran’s borders: the Strait of Hormuz.

The result is an unusual strategic stalemate. Washington has overwhelming military superiority but faces the enormous economic and geopolitical consequences of indefinitely maintaining a high-intensity campaign. Tehran has suffered catastrophic losses but retains enough military and geographic leverage to prevent an easy American victory.

That is why the conflict has increasingly moved toward economic warfare, maritime coercion, sanctions enforcement and diplomacy.

2. WASHINGTON LAUNCHES “OPERATION ECONOMIC OUTCAST”

The clearest indication of the strategic shift came on August 24.

The U.S. Treasury formally launched Operation Economic Outcast, a campaign intended to sever what Washington describes as Iran’s remaining economic lifelines.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said the campaign would broaden sanctions pressure across five major areas:

• digital assets;
• technology;
• gold;
• aviation;
• shipping.

The United States also announced sanctions against nearly 60 entities, individuals and vessels associated with Iranian military procurement, illicit petroleum commerce and other activities.

The significance of the campaign goes beyond the individual sanctions.

Washington is attempting to make the entire international ecosystem surrounding Iran economically radioactive.

A bank does not necessarily need to be Iranian to be vulnerable.

A shipping company does not necessarily need to be Iranian.

A trading company, exchange house, insurer, logistics operator or financial intermediary can potentially face U.S. consequences if Washington determines that it is helping sanctioned Iranian entities move money or goods.

That is the logic behind secondary sanctions.

The strategy is straightforward:

Make doing business with Iran more expensive and dangerous than doing business without Iran.

This is particularly important because Iran has spent years constructing alternative financial channels designed to operate outside the traditional Western banking system.

3. THE UAE CUTS A MAJOR IRANIAN ECONOMIC LIFELINE

One of the most significant regional developments came from the United Arab Emirates.

On August 18–19, the UAE announced that it had suspended all trade, commercial exchanges and financial transactions with Iran until further notice.

The decision followed an incident in which the UAE said it detected two ballistic missiles launched from Iran toward maritime traffic. Tehran rejected the accusation as baseless.

The economic importance of the decision is considerable.

The UAE has historically been one of Iran’s most important commercial gateways, particularly for re-exports, logistics and financial services.

Reuters reports that the UAE had been Iran’s second-largest trading partner after China and that Dubai had played a critical role in Iran’s international financial ecosystem.

Consequently, the UAE decision is not simply another diplomatic dispute.

It potentially removes one of the most important bridges between the sanctioned Iranian economy and global commerce.

It also demonstrates how the war is forcing Gulf states to choose between maintaining economic relationships with Iran and remaining aligned with Washington’s security and financial architecture.

4. IRAN’S ANSWER: BUILD A REGIONAL ECONOMIC SHIELD

Iran’s response has increasingly emphasized economic resilience rather than simply attempting to match American power militarily.

Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf has emerged as one of Tehran’s most visible advocates of deeper economic integration with neighboring states.

During a visit to Iraq, Qalibaf argued that Iran must develop mechanisms to overcome U.S. sanctions and called for greater use of national currencies in Iranian-Iraqi trade to reduce dependence on the U.S. dollar.

This represents a broader Iranian strategy:

reduce dollar exposure → preserve regional trade → maintain access to essential goods → protect oil revenues → keep the state functioning.

Iraq is particularly important.

Iran supplies Iraq with substantial quantities of natural gas and electricity, while Iraq is a major market for Iranian goods and a critical geographic link between Iran and the wider Arab world.

The two countries therefore have strong incentives to keep commerce moving even as Washington increases sanctions pressure.

Iran has also used diplomacy with Iraq to secure selective access through Hormuz. Tehran recently granted permission for several Iraqi oil tankers to pass through the Strait, demonstrating that Iranian control of maritime access can be applied selectively rather than uniformly.

That selective approach gives Tehran a bargaining instrument.

Iran can effectively say:

Cooperate with us, and trade may continue. Align fully with Washington, and the economic cost may increase.

5. IMPORTANT DISTINCTION: DOLLAR DE-DOLLARIZATION IS REAL, BUT SOME CLAIMS REQUIRE CAUTION

Iran is clearly seeking to reduce its dependence on the dollar.

Qalibaf has explicitly promoted national-currency trade with Iraq, while Tehran is attempting to deepen regional economic relationships.

However, claims that Iran and Oman have already established a comprehensive, fully operational rial-to-rial direct interbank system replacing the dollar for all bilateral trade should be treated cautiously.

The current evidence is stronger for negotiations and alternative settlement mechanisms than for a fully functioning replacement financial architecture.

Likewise, barter arrangements involving Iranian energy and Iraqi goods are a plausible component of sanctions-era commerce, but individual claims about specific settlement accounts, clearing mechanisms or volumes should not be presented as established fact without documentary confirmation.

The broader trend, however, is clear:

Iran is attempting to create a regional financial ecosystem less dependent on Western correspondent banking.

6. THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ: THE CENTRAL BATTLEFIELD

No issue now matters more than Hormuz.

The Strait normally carries enormous volumes of oil and other energy products. The conflict has transformed it from a commercial waterway into a strategic bargaining instrument.

Shipping has fallen dramatically.

Reuters reported that only 10 commodity vessels passed through the Strait on Wednesday, compared with a 10-day moving average of 15. Traffic has increased slightly from the previous day, but remains severely depressed.

The maritime situation remains dangerous.

A tanker was struck by an unidentified projectile in the Strait, although the fire was extinguished. The incident illustrates how even limited military activity can have enormous consequences for commercial shipping and insurance markets.

Iran’s position is uncompromising.

Qalibaf has said the Strait will not fully reopen until Washington meets conditions involving sanctions, frozen assets, military operations and the U.S. naval blockade.

Washington, meanwhile, rejects any Iranian claim to exclusive authority over international navigation.

The result is a classic strategic collision:

Iran views Hormuz as leverage.

The United States views unrestricted navigation as a strategic necessity.

Neither side can easily concede.

7. IRAN AND OMAN SEARCH FOR A MARITIME OFF-RAMP

The most promising diplomatic development is occurring between Iran and Oman.

Tehran and Muscat are working toward an interim arrangement intended to create a temporary shipping corridor and facilitate mine-clearance operations.

The discussions are not yet a final settlement.

Reuters reports that the two governments were still working through details after Iran’s Revolutionary Guards announced an agreement concerning management and revenues associated with the waterway.

Qatar has now entered the diplomatic effort more directly.

Qatar’s prime minister traveled to Tehran on August 27 seeking to revive negotiations between Washington and Tehran. Qatar has previously played a major mediating role, including in the June ceasefire that subsequently collapsed.

Pakistan is also involved in diplomatic efforts.

This creates an emerging mediation structure:

Oman — maritime mediator

Qatar — U.S.–Iran diplomatic channel

Pakistan — regional intermediary

Iraq — economic and energy intermediary

That architecture could eventually provide the parties with a way to step back without either government publicly acknowledging defeat.

8. THE U.S. MILITARY: DRAWING DOWN ONE CARRIER, REPLACING IT WITH ANOTHER

The military picture is more complicated than a simple American withdrawal.

The USS Abraham Lincoln has been deployed for more than 250 days, an exceptionally long deployment. But the carrier’s replacement, the USS George Washington, has arrived in the region.

That distinction matters.

The Lincoln’s eventual return is partly a force-maintenance and readiness issue, not proof that Washington has abandoned its military leverage.

The George Washington’s arrival ensures that the United States continues to possess a substantial carrier-based aviation capability in the region.

At the same time, Reuters has reported that the prolonged war has consumed large quantities of U.S. long-range precision missiles, raising questions about the sustainability of another major offensive.

That helps explain the current strategy.

Washington retains military force.

But it increasingly has incentives to use that force selectively while attempting to obtain political results through economic pressure.

9. IRAN’S MILITARY RESPONSE: ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

Iran’s conventional military has suffered extraordinary damage.

But Iran has not been militarily neutralized.

Its remaining strengths include:

• ballistic missiles;
• drones;
• dispersed military infrastructure;
• maritime capabilities;
• asymmetric warfare;
• regional armed partners;
• the geographic advantage of the Persian Gulf;
• and the ability to disrupt commercial shipping.

Reuters reports that Iran retains missile capabilities despite the destruction of much of its conventional air power and severe damage to its military infrastructure.

This changes the nature of the deterrence equation.

Iran does not need to defeat the U.S. Navy.

It needs only to make the cost of maintaining uninterrupted maritime commerce sufficiently high.

That can mean attacks on shipping, threats against vessels, maritime disruption, missile launches or pressure through regional armed groups.

Iran-aligned armed organizations also remain relevant. Reuters has reported cooperation between Houthi forces and Iraqi armed groups in attacks connected to the wider conflict, illustrating how Tehran’s regional network can complicate the strategic picture even when Iran itself is not launching a conventional attack.

10. THE GULF STATES ARE BUILDING A WORLD WITHOUT HORMUZ

Perhaps the most lasting consequence of the conflict will be infrastructural.

Gulf oil producers have begun accelerating efforts to reduce their dependence on the Strait.

Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline has demonstrated a capacity of approximately 7 million barrels per day, allowing crude to reach the Red Sea without passing through Hormuz.

The UAE is also expanding the strategic role of the Habshan–Fujairah pipeline, which bypasses Hormuz and allows Abu Dhabi crude to reach export terminals on the Gulf of Oman.

TotalEnergies has announced plans to invest in expanding the Fujairah pipeline, whose existing capacity is around 1.8 million barrels per day.

These systems cannot completely replace Hormuz.

But they can reduce vulnerability.

And that creates a profound strategic consequence:

Every month of disruption gives Gulf producers another incentive to build infrastructure designed to make Iran’s geographic leverage less powerful.

A long war could therefore permanently alter the energy map of the Middle East.

11. THE ECONOMIC COST IS SPREADING BEYOND IRAN

The conflict is no longer simply an Iranian economic crisis.

It is becoming a global energy and logistics problem.

Oil prices have remained elevated, with Reuters reporting that Brent has averaged around $90 per barrel in 2026 compared with roughly $70 in 2025. The conflict has also pushed up diesel and jet-fuel prices.

Shipping costs have risen.

Insurance risks have increased.

Airlines have had to modify regional operations.

Qatar’s energy sector has been particularly affected, with Reuters reporting a dramatic reduction in LNG exports during the conflict.

The economic effects therefore move through several channels:

Hormuz disruption → reduced energy exports → higher freight costs → higher insurance premiums → higher fuel prices → inflation → political pressure.

That chain is one of the reasons Washington wants the conflict resolved without returning to an unlimited bombing campaign.

12. INDIA, CHINA AND THE SANCTIONS PROBLEM

The U.S. strategy ultimately depends on international cooperation.

That is its greatest strength—and potentially its greatest weakness.

China remains Iran’s most important oil customer and a central economic lifeline for Tehran.

India has also maintained commercial ties with Iran, although its trade has already been heavily reduced by sanctions and the conflict. Reuters reports that Indian exports to Iran are now facing additional disruption after the UAE suspended its trade and financial relationships with Tehran.

Washington therefore faces a difficult calculation.

If it imposes secondary sanctions too aggressively on major economies, it risks damaging relationships with countries it needs for broader geopolitical objectives.

If it does not enforce them aggressively enough, Iran retains access to alternative markets and financial channels.

That is why the current U.S. campaign is as much a test of American financial power as it is a campaign against Iran.

13. WHAT HAPPENS NEXT?

Three scenarios now appear most plausible.

SCENARIO ONE — NEGOTIATED MARITIME DE-ESCALATION

This is currently the most constructive possibility.

Iran, Oman, Qatar and Pakistan could help establish a temporary maritime corridor.

Commercial shipping would gradually resume.

Mine-clearance operations would begin.

Washington and Tehran could then return to negotiations over sanctions, frozen assets, Iranian oil exports and nuclear restrictions.

This would not necessarily mean peace.

It would mean managed de-escalation.

Recent diplomatic activity makes this scenario more plausible than it was several weeks ago.

SCENARIO TWO — PROLONGED ECONOMIC WAR

This may be the most likely near-term scenario.

Washington continues sanctions.

Iran continues resisting.

Hormuz remains partially restricted.

Regional states attempt to keep commerce moving.

The U.S. maintains naval pressure without launching another massive bombing campaign.

The conflict becomes a war of economic endurance.

Reuters’ description of the conflict as a costly stalemate is consistent with this possibility.

SCENARIO THREE — RAPID MILITARY ESCALATION

This remains the most dangerous possibility.

A major Iranian attack on U.S. forces, a serious attack on commercial shipping, a mining incident, or the collapse of Hormuz negotiations could trigger a new U.S. military campaign.

Iran could respond with missiles, drones or maritime attacks.

Israel could also intensify operations against Iranian-linked forces.

The result could be a return to direct state-on-state warfare.

14. THE KEY INDICATORS TO WATCH

For the next several weeks, AI TV INFO recommends watching seven indicators above all others:

The most encouraging signal is that Hormuz traffic has begun to rise slightly and that diplomatic contacts have intensified.

The most concerning signal is that the waterway remains severely disrupted and a tanker was struck by an unidentified projectile even while negotiations were underway.

15. AI TV INFO’s ASSESSMENT

The conflict has not ended.

But it has changed.

The first phase was about destroying Iranian military power.

The second phase is about destroying Iran’s ability to finance itself.

The third phase—if diplomacy succeeds—could be about negotiating a new regional order.

The fundamental contest is therefore no longer simply:

Washington vs. Tehran.

It is increasingly:

U.S. financial power vs. Iran’s sanctions-resistance networks.

U.S. naval power vs. Iran’s control of Hormuz.

Gulf economic integration vs. Iranian regional leverage.

Dollar-based finance vs. alternative settlement systems.

And ultimately:

Can either side force the other to accept a political settlement without another major war?

For Washington, the challenge is that military superiority has not produced political capitulation. For Tehran, the challenge is that surviving the war does not mean surviving indefinitely under blockade and sanctions.

The strategic balance therefore remains unstable.

Iran has survived the opening military campaign, but its economy is under extraordinary pressure.

The United States retains overwhelming military power, but prolonged war is consuming resources and creating political and economic costs.

Israel has succeeded in degrading Iran’s military capabilities but remains exposed to the wider regional consequences of a conflict that has not produced a final settlement.

And the Gulf states—particularly Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE—are increasingly trying to shape the postwar order themselves rather than simply waiting for Washington and Tehran to decide their fate.

THE BOTTOM LINE

The U.S.–Israel–Iran conflict has entered an endgame, but not a peace process.

The immediate battlefield is Hormuz.

The principal American weapon is increasingly financial isolation.

Iran’s principal remaining strategic weapons are missiles, asymmetric warfare, regional networks and control over maritime disruption.

The principal diplomatic effort is now centered on Oman, Qatar and Pakistan.

And the decisive question is whether economic pressure can produce an agreement before another military incident pushes the region back toward full-scale war.

For now, the evidence points to a fragile stalemate with a narrow diplomatic opening rather than either a clear Iranian defeat or an imminent return to unrestricted U.S. bombing.

AI TV INFO — SPECIAL REPORT
Reporting framework based on publicly available information and reporting available through August 27, 2026. Claims attributed to governments or military actors are identified as such; disputed allegations are not treated as independently established facts.