CHINA IN AFRICA:

HOW BEIJING BECAME THE CONTINENT’S NUMBER ONE TRADE PARTNER

From the railways of the 1970s to a $295 billion trading relationship today, China’s rise in Africa was decades in the making.

AI TV INFO | Global Intelligence — International Affairs & Economic Report

China’s rise to become Africa’s largest individual-country trading partner was not the result of a single agreement, a single investment, or a sudden geopolitical shift.

It was the product of a strategy that unfolded over decades.

Diplomatic alliances established during the era of decolonization were followed by infrastructure projects, expanding trade, Chinese investment, development finance and, later, the Belt and Road Initiative.

The result is one of the most consequential economic relationships in the developing world.

In 2000, China-Africa trade was only around $10.6 billion.

By 2024, it had reached approximately $295.6 billion.

China has remained Africa’s largest trading partner for 16 consecutive years.

But how did that happen?

CHAPTER ONE — THE RELATIONSHIP BEGAN BEFORE THE BOOM

China’s engagement with Africa did not begin with the commodities boom of the 2000s.

Its political foundations were laid during the era of African decolonization.

In the 1950s and 1960s, Beijing presented itself as part of a broader community of Asian, African and other developing countries challenging Western domination.

The 1955 Bandung Conference became an important symbol of this emerging Global South diplomacy.

For newly independent African states, China was not a former European colonial power.

Beijing instead presented itself as another country that had experienced foreign domination.

That historical narrative would later become an important element of China’s diplomacy in Africa.

Then came a major diplomatic milestone.

In 1971, African countries played an important role in the United Nations General Assembly vote that restored the People’s Republic of China to China’s seat at the United Nations.

Political relationships were therefore established long before China became an economic giant.

CHAPTER TWO — THE RAILWAY THAT BECAME A SYMBOL

One of the most famous examples of early Chinese engagement was the TAZARA Railway, linking Tanzania and Zambia.

Built in the 1970s with Chinese assistance, the railway connected Zambia’s copper-producing regions to the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam.

The project was economically important.

But it was also political.

At a time when much of Africa was still emerging from colonial rule, China was demonstrating that it was prepared to finance and build major infrastructure projects in partnership with African governments.

This created something more valuable than a single railway:

political credibility.

China was beginning to associate itself with infrastructure and development rather than territorial conquest.

CHAPTER THREE — THEN CHINA NEEDED AFRICA

The relationship changed dramatically when China’s economy began accelerating.

China’s industrialization created enormous demand for energy and raw materials.

Africa had many of them.

Oil.

Copper.

Cobalt.

Iron ore.

Manganese.

Bauxite.

Agricultural commodities.

Countries such as Angola, Nigeria, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo became increasingly important to Chinese companies and the Chinese economy.

At the same time, China was becoming one of the world’s largest manufacturing centres.

That created a powerful economic complementarity.

AFRICA NEEDED:

Infrastructure.

Machinery.

Vehicles.

Electronics.

Telecommunications equipment.

Construction technology.

CHINA NEEDED:

Oil.

Minerals.

Metals.

Agricultural products.

Markets.

The relationship therefore developed into a large-scale exchange:

African commodities → China

Chinese manufactured goods → Africa

And the scale expanded rapidly.

CHAPTER FOUR — 2000: THE FOCAC TURNING POINT

Then came one of the most important institutional developments.

In 2000, China and African countries established the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation — FOCAC.

FOCAC transformed what had previously been a collection of bilateral relationships into a much more structured China-Africa framework.

Chinese and African leaders could meet regularly and negotiate cooperation in areas including:

• trade
• investment
• infrastructure
• agriculture
• health
• education
• development finance
• industrial cooperation

The timing was critical.

China’s economy was accelerating.

African governments were seeking infrastructure and investment.

And Chinese companies were being encouraged by Beijing to expand internationally.

The result was a rapidly expanding economic relationship.

China’s own government records that China became Africa’s No. 1 trading partner in 2009.

CHAPTER FIVE — THE “GO OUT” ERA

Behind the diplomatic relationship was a second development:

Chinese companies were going global.

Beijing encouraged Chinese enterprises to invest abroad, obtain resources, develop markets and build international business networks.

Africa offered opportunities that many companies found attractive:

Large infrastructure needs.

Natural resources.

Growing cities.

Rapid population growth.

And relatively underdeveloped transport and energy networks.

Chinese companies consequently became increasingly involved in:

mining

railways

roads

ports

power generation

telecommunications

industrial parks

construction

The relationship was therefore no longer simply:

China buys African oil.

It increasingly became:

China finances infrastructure → Chinese companies build infrastructure → African production and trade expand → Chinese companies gain commercial opportunities → bilateral trade grows.

CHAPTER SIX — INFRASTRUCTURE AS ECONOMIC STRATEGY

This may be the most important part of the story.

Trade requires infrastructure.

A mine without a railway is difficult to exploit.

A factory without electricity cannot operate efficiently.

A port without roads and railways cannot handle large volumes of goods.

China understood this.

And African governments had an enormous infrastructure deficit.

Chinese companies therefore became major participants in building the physical networks that allow economies to function.

Railways.

Roads.

Ports.

Power stations.

Industrial zones.

Telecommunications networks.

The Belt and Road Initiative, launched in 2013, subsequently expanded this infrastructure-oriented approach.

The strategic significance was considerable.

Infrastructure does not simply move goods.

It can determine where goods move, who controls logistics, and which markets become economically connected.

CHAPTER SEVEN — THE APPEAL OF NON-INTERFERENCE

There is another reason China’s model has appealed to many African governments.

China emphasizes the principles of:

sovereignty

non-interference

state-to-state cooperation

economic development

Beijing has explicitly described its African policy using a “five-no” formulation, including no interference in internal affairs and no imposition of China’s political system.

This differs from the approach traditionally associated with Western institutions, where development finance has often been accompanied by conditions or expectations concerning governance, economic reform or political institutions.

For African governments seeking rapid infrastructure development, the Chinese approach can therefore be attractive.

But there is another side to this argument.

Non-interference can also mean that China is willing to maintain economic relationships with governments whose political systems Western governments may criticize.

The difference is therefore not simply:

China = good

West = bad

It is a difference in the instruments of influence.

CHAPTER EIGHT — THE NUMBERS TELL THE STORY

The transformation is extraordinary.

In 2000:

China-Africa trade: approximately $10.6 billion

In 2024:

China-Africa trade: approximately $295.6 billion

That represents an increase of almost 27 times over roughly a quarter century.

In 2024:

Chinese exports to Africa: $178.8 billion

African exports to China: $116.8 billion

Total trade: $295.6 billion.

The figures reveal both the strength and the imbalance of the relationship.

China sells Africa substantially more goods than it buys from Africa.

And the composition of trade remains important.

Africa exports substantial quantities of commodities.

China exports large quantities of manufactured products, machinery and technology.

CHAPTER NINE — THE RESOURCE QUESTION

This is where the debate becomes more complicated.

China’s involvement has helped create roads, railways, industrial parks, telecommunications networks and other infrastructure.

But infrastructure can serve different purposes.

A railway can connect cities and stimulate industrialization.

It can also make it easier to transport minerals from a mine to a port.

A port can facilitate African exports.

It can also facilitate the export of raw materials to China.

So the central question is not simply:

“Is Chinese investment good or bad?”

The more important question is:

“What economic structure does the investment create?”

If Africa exports raw materials and imports finished products, the basic dependency can remain.

If African countries use investment and infrastructure to manufacture, process and export higher-value goods, the relationship can become much more transformative.

That distinction is crucial.

CHAPTER TEN — CHINA’S AFRICAN TRADE IS CHANGING

The relationship is not frozen in the old oil-for-manufactured-goods model.

China has increasingly sought African agricultural products and other non-resource goods.

Chinese authorities say imports from Africa have expanded and that tariff-free access for least-developed countries has progressively increased.

In 2024, China announced that it would extend zero-tariff treatment to 100% of tariff lines for least-developed countries with which it maintains diplomatic relations.

African agricultural exports to China have also grown.

China’s imports from Africa reached $116.8 billion in 2024, according to Chinese trade data.

The relationship is therefore becoming more diversified.

But the trade imbalance remains.

CHAPTER ELEVEN — THE AFRICAN QUESTION

And this brings us to the central issue.

China has become Africa’s largest trading partner.

But being Africa’s largest trading partner does not automatically mean that Africa is winning or losing.

The answer depends on what African economies do with the relationship.

There are two possible trajectories.

TRAJECTORY ONE

Africa remains primarily a supplier of:

oil + minerals + agricultural commodities

while importing:

machinery + electronics + vehicles + manufactured goods.

In this model, trade grows—but structural dependency can remain.

TRAJECTORY TWO

Africa uses:

Chinese investment + infrastructure + technology + access to China’s market

to build:

factories + processing industries + regional supply chains + African brands + higher-value exports.

That would represent a very different economic relationship.

And this is where the African Continental Free Trade Area — AfCFTA becomes strategically important.

A factory in one African country does not only have the potential to serve that country’s domestic market.

If regional trade barriers fall, it can potentially serve a continental market of more than a billion people.

CHAPTER TWELVE — CHINA IS NOT THE ONLY PLAYER

The rise of China does not mean Africa has abandoned Europe or the United States.

Africa continues to maintain major economic, political and security relationships with:

the European Union

the United States

India

the Gulf states

Japan

South Korea

Turkey

Russia

and others.

African governments increasingly have the possibility of negotiating among multiple external powers.

That is a fundamental difference from the colonial era.

African states today retain formal sovereignty and can seek competing sources of capital, technology, markets and political support.

The strategic question is whether they can turn that competition into greater African bargaining power.

CONCLUSION — FROM COLONIAL DEPENDENCY TO STRATEGIC CHOICE?

China’s rise in Africa did not happen overnight.

It began with diplomacy.

It gained credibility through infrastructure.

It accelerated with China’s industrialization.

It was institutionalized through FOCAC.

It expanded through Chinese companies and development finance.

And it reached another level through the Belt and Road Initiative.

From roughly $10.6 billion in China-Africa trade in 2000 to $295.6 billion in 2024, the transformation has been extraordinary.

But the numbers alone do not answer the most important question.

China has become Africa’s largest trading partner.

What Africa gains from that relationship will ultimately depend on what African countries produce, what they control, what they negotiate—and whether infrastructure and investment are converted into African industrial capacity.

The real story, therefore, is not simply the rise of China in Africa.

It is the emergence of a new geopolitical contest over who will finance Africa’s development, who will control its resources and supply chains, and whether Africa itself will become the principal beneficiary of its economic transformation.

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International Affairs • Economics • Geopolitics • Africa